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Abstract 
No state can do very well without perceived as legitimate. While the state’s efforts 
to legitimate its power is well covered in the literature, the ordinary people’s role 
in legitimacy is less investigated. This study is informed by the notion that 
legitimacy is a relational concept. Legitimacy is created in the interaction between 
ruler and ruled. The power structure is dependent on the people’s active 
legitimation. The early years of the Cultural Revolution serves as example how 
popular legitimation works in a context of Chinese socialism. By analysing the 
consumer culture that has arisen recently around the territorial disputes in the East 
and South China Seas, I argue that political consumerism has become a new mode 
for legitimating the Chinese political system for ordinary citizens.  
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1 Introduction 
Xisha, Xisha, Xisha, 
The treasure of the Motherland, my beloved home, 
The treasure of the Motherland, my beloved home. 
 
Xisha is the Chinese name for the Paracel Islands, the small island group that are 
the subject of territorial dispute between many countries of the South China Sea. 
The above lines makes up the refrain of the lead motif to the 1976 Chinese movie 
“The South China Sea Turmoil” [Nanhai Fengyun]. It is a movie that depicts the 
heroic defence of the islands by the local inhabitants and the brave sailors of the 
People’s Liberation Army’s naval forces against South Vietnamese invaders.  
The lines of this song could also be heard sung in a resent coverage in 
Swedish radio, sung by a Chinese woman who had just returned from a cruise to 
the disputed islands. Apart from swimming and deep sea fishing, she had also 
partaken in a flag-ceremony organised by the traveling agent on one of the islands 
(Carlquist, 2015). 
In a time when the huge mass campaigns of the Mao-era have become 
obsolete, the legitimation of the Chinese regime must rely on other expressions. 
Like in Western democracies, political consumerism pose a new way for citizens 
to act politically, even in China. The example of the cruise to Paracel Islands can 
be one new way through which the political system in China can be legitimated.  
1.1 Aim 
The durability and stability of political regimes and government performance are 
questions that interests many students of political science. Why do some regimes 
fall and why do some remain? And why do states crumble at a specific moment? 
Why does subjects comply with the laws of a state?  
One way of addressing these questions is through the concept of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is frequently used about various phenomena, but in this thesis the 
matter of interest is states. A legitimate regime is more likely to enjoy the support 
of its subjects. With that follows political stability and compliance with laws and 
norms. On the other hand, a regime that is considered to be illegitimate by its 
subject are more likely to suffer from social unrest, protest or even revolution. To 
be considered legitimate has its obvious advantages for any regime. Legitimacy 
seems to work like a “resource” for effective governing. It greases the 
governmental machinery. Therefore, governments put a lot of effort into 
appearing legitimate. This makes the concept of legitimacy determine many of the 
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activities that is central to government behaviour. Legitimation is thus 
fundamental to what it is to govern. To analyse and problematize the concept of 
legitimacy therefor seems like a fitting task for the political scientist.  
However, the focus of this thesis will not be on the legitimation activities 
undertaken by states or governments, but on the citizens subordinate to 
governmental power and their role in legitimation. As will be evident in the 
theoretical chapter, both theoretical and empirical research of legitimacy tends to 
focus on the state, institutions or other power holders. But on the occasion when 
the subordinates’ role in legitimacy is discussed, the focal point is often their 
views or opinions about the legitimacy of an institution or government (see Levi 
et al., 2009, and contributions to Erman & Uhlin, 2010, for an account of the 
global perspective), and empirically, these attitudes can be mapped through 
surveys or interviews. In this thesis I will work towards a slightly different 
approach. I want to turn the focus to the governed, the subordinates and their role 
in legitimacy and the actions they undertake to legitimate the power-relation they 
are living under. This side of legitimacy is more thoroughly researched in liberal 
democracies where the relation between ruler and ruled is legitimated through 
elections, or where political demonstrations is held for legitimating a cause. But 
are all non-democracies viewed as illegitimate by their population? If the answer 
is no, which I think is the case, how then are such regimes legitimated by the 
people living under it? To uphold a system of governance solely through coercive 
force and suppression is extremely costly. While that form of rule of course is 
present in China, it is hard to claim that the Chinese society is only upheld by 
sheer force.  
Weber famously equated legitimacy with people’s belief in legitimacy 
(Abromeit & Stoiber, 2007). I argue that there is more to legitimacy than just 
people’s belief in it. Because of that, I will more often use the word legitimation 
than legitimacy. Legitimation is the actions that people undertake that conveys 
legitimacy to their government. Again, in a liberal democracy, this works for 
example through open and free elections to representative intuitions and other 
official offices. But in an authoritarian society, legitimation cannot take this form 
for obvious reasons. It is also harder to conduct surveys about the people’s 
attitudes towards the government in China and other authoritarian societies 
because of the question’s sensitive political nature. But the need to study 
legitimacy in these societies does not go away. So, what kinds of evidence is 
needed for determining the legitimacy of a regime if the possibility to conduct 
surveys are closed? What kinds of data are suitable to look at from a legitimacy 
perspective? It is the task for the student of legitimacy in China to identify these 
legitimating actions and analyse them as such.  
When acknowledging the subordinates role in legitimation one is informed by 
the notion that it takes two to do legitimacy. Legitimacy is in this view a relational 
concept. When talking about legitimacy we do not mean the private opinions of 
the subordinate, but on the “thing” that is created in the interaction between 
governor and governed. The question that leads this investigation is: How is the 
political power structure legitimated in China?  
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By looking at carefully selected data I aim to support the argument that even 
non-democratic regimes like China relies on popular legitimation for its 
legitimacy. And by closely investigating this material I try to show how this can 
be done. 
The aim of this investigation is thus twofold. I seek to understand the 
relational concept of legitimacy and legitimation from a perspective of the 
governed, which hopefully can contribute to a theory of legitimacy. The 
theoretical contribution lies in a coupling of legitimacy-theory and theories of 
political consumerism. I also seek to understand legitimacy aspects of politics 
under “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” through this perspective of 
popular legitimation. 
To make my argument clear I will exemplify with an analysis of two very 
different examples. The first case is the early years of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution, which might seem odd at first from a legitimacy point of 
view. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was targeted under the 
revolution by Mao, his followers and “the revolutionary masses”, and were 
suffering a legitimacy crisis, we can still observe powerful legitimating activities 
undertaken by ordinary citizens that are conveying legitimacy to Mao Zedong.  
The other exemplification of legitimation practises are the consumerism that is 
related to the nationalistic discourse around the disputed areas of the East and 
South China Sea. Consumerism, which often is associated with the post-industrial, 
late-modern West, is here analysed in the Chinese context as a form of political 
participation.  
1.2 Previous research 
Research about the legitimacy of the Chinese regime is often focused on the state 
and party’s efforts at legitimating its rule. Robert Weatherley (2006) has studied 
the legitimation of China’s authoritarian rule during the period since the creation 
of the People’s Republic in 1949 till the modern day regime. Weatherley applies a 
loose theoretical framework inspired by Weber for analysing Chinese politics as 
constant shifts in legitimacy and legitimacy crises.  He convincingly argues that 
especially during the Mao era, 1949-1976, the Chinese regime relied heavily on 
legitimating its rule through amassing popular enthusiasm and engagement in 
huge mass mobilisation efforts. But in Weatherley’s account, the Chinese masses 
are mainly taking a passive role in legitimating the process. More in-depth 
accounts of for example the Cultural Revolution paints a more complex picture. 
As we shall see, under that time the Chinese people enjoyed more freedoms than 
before, and the grassroots spontaneously organised themselves to show support 
for Mao and his policies. 
Two main themes crystallises in the literature on legitimacy in China. Since 
the country is a strict authoritarian society there is a focus on the regime’s efforts 
to create legitimacy through propaganda. The propaganda of the Cultural 
Revolution in described as preaching a “personality-cult” of Mao. Participation in 
  4 
mass campaigns and political movements are explained through a religious lens 
with terminology like “cult”, “worship” and “political religion” (Zuo, 1991; 
Leese, 2007; 2011). In later years, there has been an increasing attention paid to 
the government’s nationalist propaganda. Nationalism has become an important 
base for creating legitimacy when the appeal of ideology is waning and the 
economy has slowed down (Liu, 2006; Liu, 2012; Hyun & Kim, 2014). However, 
the CCP is still relying on its Marxism-Leninism heritage and its own ideological 
innovations for creating legitimacy through propaganda (Holbig & Gilley, 2010).  
Another perspective is to view legitimacy as created by the regime through its 
provision of public goods. If the material needs of the Chinese population is 
provided for, they are assumed to accept the party’s rule as legitimate. Weatherley 
characterises the post-Mao-era legitimacy as being performance-centred and the 
CCP became “the party of economic performance” (2006:164). Zhu contends that 
the party has taken a very pragmatic stance towards a strategy of “performance 
legitimacy”, by basing its right to rule on providing economic growth (2011:124). 
Events like the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games to has been analysed as “mass 
distractions”; state efforts to lead the people’s attention away from societal 
problems (Brady, 2008; 2009; 2012, Brady & He, 2009, Brady & Wang, 2009). 
Other focus on the regimes appropriation of Western commercial models for 
controlling public opinion through mass media; turning the media into an even 
more powerful propaganda machine for creating legitimacy (Stockmann & 
Gallagher, 2011; Stockmann, 2013;). To sum up, what the Chinese regime is 
described as doing is a form of panem et circenses by providing economic growth, 
propaganda and “mass distractions”. 
While it is undoubtedly true that the Chinese Communist party is making 
efforts to legitimate its rule, both through propaganda and by providing better 
services, to solely focus on the government’s view and efforts on legitimation is to 
miss out on some interesting aspects of legitimacy. In this perspective the Chinese 
people are taking a passive role in the legitimacy of the power relationship. To be 
a bit blunt: they are portrayed as lacking agency, either deceived by propaganda or 
bought by promises of a materially comfortable life. However, in research where 
citizens are granted agency the focus is often on liberal resistance, like humorous 
regime critique and witty satire (Nordin & Richaud, 2014). This perspective is so 
pervasive is because China is (of course rightly) considered a strict authoritarian 
state and that the citizens lack the opportunity to partake in elections and other 
practises that are usually deemed legitimating. But, it is hard to imagine a 
description of legitimacy in a liberal democracy where the subjects were excluded 
from the legitimacy equation. What will be done in this thesis is a conceptual 
broadening of legitimation that includes practises that not traditionally has been 
seen as political participation, but that still are loaded with political significance.  
However, it is important to raise a crucial point early on in this thesis to avoid 
misunderstandings. In the political science tradition, legitimacy can be both a 
normative and a descriptive concept. It is the descriptive aspect of the concept that 
will be analysed in this thesis. I will not make any arguments concerning whether 
the current Chinese regime is legitimate or not in any normative sense. This thesis 
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will not make any claim to ascertain to what degree the Chinese regime is 
considered legitimate. 
1.3 Disposition 
In the following chapter the concept of legitimacy and legitimation will be 
discussed. Following that is a chapter on methodology where methods and 
materials, their selection and how they are analysed are elaborated on. I then turn 
to discussing the legitimation practises that where flourishing during the Cultural 
Revolution. Political consumerism in relation to legitimacy and how that works in 
practise is discussed in the chapter called “Consumer Legitimacy”. The thesis 
ends with some short concluding remarks.  
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2 Legitimacy and Legitimation 
We use the word legitimacy in everyday language, and it is often very 
straightforward what we mean by calling something legitimate or illegitimate. 
However, if one starts to think more deeply about the concept one finds that it is a 
quite complex and rich one. Since Thucydides, and probably much earlier still, 
people have thought long and hard about what legitimacy is and which states that 
are legitimate and which are illegitimate (Zelditch, 2001).  
The reader will find that I am talking more about legitimation than legitimacy. 
In this chapter the concept of legitimacy and legitimation will be discussed 
through various important contributors to the concept. In the section “The role of 
consent” I discuss legitimation more thoroughly in relation to consent and why it 
is so important for my argument to focus on actions. The section ends in a concept 
of legitimation that is useful for understanding legitimacy under two different 
historic periods in modern China.  
2.1 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is an utterly contested concept and there is much confusion and 
disagreement on how to conceptualise it (Morris, 2008:15). The state is essential 
as an ordering principle for modern political life, and legitimacy is thought to be 
vital for the ability of states to maintain social order (Morris, 2008:16). This is 
because the high costs and limitations for the state in producing order through 
sanctions, coercion and brute force. Legitimate regimes can rely less on those and 
focus on governance because they can count on the compliance of the 
subordinates.  
It seems hard to treat the subject of legitimacy without mentioning Weber. He 
is still widely cited and his model of different types of legitimacy is still used for 
analysis of power relations. Weber defined legitimacy as being no more or less 
than people’s belief in it (Abromeit & Stoiber, 2007). He famously defined three 
types of legitimate authority: traditional, rational-legal and charismatic. A power 
relation can be legitimate through the belief in the sanctity of traditions, or the 
justness and correctness of the system of rules, or the charismatic qualities and 
persuasive abilities of a ruler (Beetham, 1991:23-24). However, while still applied 
by scholars, this typology has been targeted by severe critique. 
A lot of intellectual effort has also been put into analysing the concept of 
legitimacy by political and moral philosophers. Often, legitimacy is seen as a 
normative concept, a quality that some regimes enjoy, while others do not. A 
power relation that is considered legitimate is satisfying a set of criteria 
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constructed by the observer, like Barker (2007) and Abromeit & Stoiber (2007). 
The respect for human rights, procedural justice and the just exercise of power is 
often viewed as vital elements of legitimate government (Barker, 2001:9). The 
importance of normative theory lies in its prescriptive nature. However it lacks 
explanatory power. When discussing legitimacy of power relations in other times 
or places than our own, it is unfair and very unhelpful to discuss legitimacy in 
relation to normative values of our specific context and apply it elsewhere and 
elsewhen. But as I will show below, to theoretically separate normative 
assumptions from the concept of legitimacy is easier said than done. 
2.1.1 Legitimacy as a descriptive concept 
As established above, a legitimate government can rely less on coercion and 
expect their subjects to voluntarily contribute to public cooperation. There are 
huge costs for a regime to rely mainly on coercion and to uphold their rule 
through force. A legitimate rule can rest on domination without solely depend on 
sanctions or incentives. They do so by conveying arguments to the public about 
their just authority by arguments that are deemed normatively appropriate by the 
populace. For this kind of definition it matters little if the norms are “objectively” 
good for the nation (or even humanity). What is important is whether these norms 
which legitimacy rests on are valid within the society. 
A strand of literature tries to treat legitimacy without universal moral or 
normative content. In the tradition of Weber, legitimacy is defined as the people’s 
belief in the normative appropriateness of a ruling regime. Central to this 
understanding of legitimacy is the belief that rules should be observed on the basis 
of who enacted them and how it was made (Levi et al., 2009:354). Morris places 
this legality or lawfulness of the notion of legitimacy as fundamental and 
identifies legitimacy as mainly a property or status of states (2008:17). But he 
continues investigating what legitimacy is by establishing that legitimacy is a 
status determined by its “rights”. The rights a legitimate state are bestowed with 
determines if it is legitimate or not. First he identifies the right to exist as a 
fundamental trait of a legitimate state. Next comes a territory that is bound to that 
state and a right to do things in that territory; to rule exclusively (2009:18-19). But 
what Morris seems to be describing is sovereignty and sovereign states. If 
applying his conceptualisation of legitimacy on the modern state, then all 
sovereign states that exists are legitimate. But here Taiwan and other states with 
complex sovereignty status raise problems. By stripping legitimacy of beliefs and 
values of people it seems like we end up with a concept of legitimacy that is not 
very fruitful for the aim of this thesis, as it is to actually focusing on the different 
values that relate to legitimacy in different societies. 
What is common for these different conceptualisations of legitimacy is that 
they focus on the input side of governance. The questions are: are the rules of 
power perceived as just, are the processes where these rules come about just and 
are the based on just principles? Bo Rothstein challenges the view that legitimacy 
is created at the input side. He criticises the notion that democratic institutions 
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create legitimacy, even in the stable Nordic democracies. Instead Rothstein argues 
that legitimacy is created, maintained and destroyed at the output side; that is to 
say the capacity of a regime to produce goods and services for the population 
(2009:312-313, 316). This view, that legitimacy can be created by providing 
services and goods, has been embraced by scholars who researches legitimacy in 
authoritarian states where legitimacy certainly not can be created on the input side 
of the power system through democratic processes. However, Rothstein’s theory 
appears controversial to some because it suggests that non-democratic regimes 
could be legitimate.   
Levi, Sacks & Tyler combines the input/output-theory to provide a formal 
model for how legitimacy is produced under a certain power relation. A mix of 
government performance, the ability of leaders to persuade and administrative 
competence leads to what they call “trustworthiness of government”. This, 
together with perceived procedural justice feeds the “value-based legitimacy” of 
the regime. If a regime enjoys value-based legitimacy, they can expect 
compliance, i.e. “behavioural legitimacy” (2009:357). But these authors fail to 
theoretically place compliance in relation to legitimacy. Are compliance and 
legitimacy to be seen as parts of the same concept, namely legitimacy, as the 
name “behavioural legitimacy” seems to imply? Or is compliance simply caused 
by legitimacy? If compliance is a part of the legitimacy concept, and not a 
consequence, one cannot infer compliance from legitimacy and at the same time 
give compliance as evidence of legitimacy. 
Rodney Barker criticises some theories of legitimacy, like the above, for being 
somewhat circular. The circularity of the argument stems from the attempt to rid 
legitimacy of normative content and make it into a purely empirical matter. He 
tackles this issue by taking a different approach to the concept of legitimacy than 
the above mentioned scholars. Barker criticises that legitimacy is sometimes used 
tautologically when invoked as an explanation to the question: Why do people 
comply with the laws of the governor? The problem occurs when legitimacy is 
bereft of all normative content and when legitimacy is derived from the behaviour 
of subordinates. This approach risks to collapse compliance and legitimacy into 
each other so that they cease to be separate things.  
If legitimacy is not attributed by putting regimes to the test of normative criteria, but is said 
to exist when the rightfulness of government is as a matter of observable historical fact 
acknowledged, then, it is argued, legitimacy is merely being inferred from observable 
compliance with commands. Because people obey, they are assumed to regard the 
command as legitimate. But in that case, the concept is of no use, because it is no more 
than observation of compliance, masquerading as an account of independently observable 
belief (Barker, 1990:56).   
The consent of subjects is inferred from obedience to the regime, and then when 
explaining obedience, consent is invoked as cause. Legitimacy can thus be used as 
a deus ex machina-explanation when all others fail (Barker, 2001:10-11). 
To work around that problem Barker suggests a rejection of 
“legitimacy/legitimate”, instead focusing on “legitimation” (2001:23). He reserves 
“legitimacy/legitimate” for normative inquiries into the morality of a power 
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relation, whilst “legitimation” points to the measures that regimes undertake in 
order to legitimate their rule. In this thesis I will try to follow Barkers invention. 
Legitimation is to be understood as observable human actions, vital for political 
life, rather than beliefs about some abstract quality harboured in people’s minds. 
Legitimation is a characteristic that describes what it is to be a ruler and not a 
condition of successful rulers. Asking whether a regime is legitimate can be 
tautological, while asking in what way and to what success a regime claim 
legitimacy is on the contrary an important question for political scientists. But 
where Barker is interested in the self-legitimation of rulers, this thesis seeks to 
investigate how citizens and subordinates legitimates power relations. If we are to 
avoid being circular, we cannot observe actions that are mere compliance.  
2.1.2 Three levels of legitimacy  
David Beetham shares Barkers agenda to address legitimacy without making 
universal moral or normative claims. But contrary to the above author, he offers a 
thorough critique of Weber, and his widely influential taxonomy if legitimacy. 
Beetham claims that Weber misunderstands the concept of legitimacy when 
equating it with people’s belief in legitimacy (1991:8). To contend that a regime is 
legitimate because its subjects believes it to be legitimate is to misunderstand the 
relationship between legitimacy and the beliefs of people. A power-relation is not 
legitimate because people believe it to be so, but because legitimacy can be 
justified by beliefs, values and norms, according to Beetham (1991:11). A 
seemingly small difference, one might think, but it has big implications for how 
Beetham continues his investigation of the concept. Betham’s states that power 
that is “acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of 
consent, we call […] legitimate” (Beetham, 1991:3). This definition is more 
detailed and complex than the Weberian definition that only gives us “belief” as 
ground for legitimacy. This definition of legitimacy will therefore be used 
throughout the thesis. 
Beetham’s definition hints to his three-levelled analysis of the concept. The 
first level is that of rules. A power-relation can be said to be legitimate if it 
follows established rules and laws within a given society. These can be informal 
customs, conventions and norms, or formalised into legal codes. Illegitimate 
power is exercised where these rules are broken or circumvented (1991:16). 
However, legitimacy cannot be established by solely complying with rules. If the 
rules themselves are considered unfair or against norms, just following them will 
not make the regime legitimate. This observation forms the second level of 
legitimacy and asserts that a rule must be justified in terms of shared beliefs by 
both rulers and subjects. The valid source (or sources) of power varies across 
societies but are based on beliefs about the appropriate exercise of power and the 
acquisition of it (1991:17). 
Beetham’s third level of legitimacy “involves the demonstrable expression of 
consent on the part of the subordinate to the particular power relation in which 
they are involved” (1991:18). The fact that subjects in some way express consent 
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to the power relation they are subjected to is vital for its legitimacy. But consent is 
a complex and difficult concept. Especially when coupled with legitimacy. This is 
so because legitimacy is thought to entail normative obligations on the subjects 
(Morris, 2008:17). And consent as a concept is tightly connected with 
voluntariness. If consenting to something entails the assumption of a voluntary 
agreement, what then does voluntary mean, and what kind of evidence is needed 
in order to prove something is done voluntarily? And, how can the researcher 
know the true intent of an actor? Even if the researcher has the opportunity to ask 
about the intent, there is no way of knowing if the respondent is actually telling 
her true intention for many reasons. The respondent could be lying, or is simply 
afraid or otherwise reluctant to tell her intent. But there is also the possibility that 
one is acting without being completely aware of one’s intent and any retelling of 
an intent is a rationalisation in hindsight. The problem of the role of consent in 
legitimation is so complex it deserves a separate section. 
2.1.3 The role of consent 
It is tricky even for scholars in the liberal tradition to once and for all establish 
what consent is, and what kind of obligations it produces. Edmundson even goes 
so far as to rule all attempts to theoretically justify power on the basis of consent 
derived from individual will, as deemed to fail (Edmundson 2011:353).  
Liberalism is a failure only insofar as it embraces the faulty notion that political theory can 
be liberal all the way down—making the individual’s will not only a value to be protected 
and promoted but the very foundation of legitimate political authority (Edmundson 
2011:353).  
If basing legitimacy of democracy on free will and the individual’s consent is 
doomed to fail, then the same must be even truer for authoritarian societies. But 
since the concept of consent is so vital for the legitimacy of liberal democracy, 
consent is an important feature of legitimacy wherever it is applied. There is a 
strong sense that consenting must be done voluntarily in order for it to be seen as 
genuine. Consent forced from under gun point can hardly be considered as valid. 
It gets even harder if we try to rid legitimacy of normative claims and at the same 
time keeping voluntary consent in the liberal sense of individual will, especially 
so in an authoritarian context. Can anyone really consent to living in a 
dictatorship? A tempting question to pose. But on the other hand, can anyone 
really consent to living in a democracy? Where does the socialisation of values 
end and where does genuine will begin? What can be determined as genuinely 
voluntary? This rabbit hole can prove to be infinitely deep.  
Beetham solves the problem of consent by concluding that what is important 
is not its underlying intention, but the actions that express consent. It is important 
because these actions produce legitimacy, not because it gives us evidence about 
peoples’ true beliefs. Actions that express consent are important because of the 
symbolic power and normative force they create which binds the subject to the 
ruler (Beetham, 1991:91). These actions carry with them the notion of 
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commitment on behalf of the one acting, and these actions publicly validate the 
relationship to those external to it. Beetham’s approach is also sensitive to the 
contingency of values through history and space. What consent is and who can 
give it varies over time and between places. If the goal is to establish an 
empirically founded theory of legitimacy one needs to be sensitive to this fact.  
Beetham differentiates between two types of actions that express consent. The 
first of these, which is not going to be extensively covered because of the aim of 
this thesis, is the liberal approach that has crystallised into democratic elections of 
representational democracy. Central to this type of consent is the possibility to 
freely choose between different candidates, and the individualist notion that 
consent cannot be given on behalf of another (Beetham, 1991:91-92). 
In non-liberal societies, both past and present, legitimacy must be conferred 
through other types of actions than free elections. For obvious reasons, mock 
elections in dictatorships and the elections in the early republics of Europe and 
America cannot be sorted under the liberal label because they either lack choice 
between valid candidates other than the ruler, or that suffrage was determined by 
sex and property. However, even that kind of election can prove legitimating in 
the right context.  
There are three different kinds of modes that Beetham identifies as conferring 
legitimacy in non-liberal societies. The first is swearing an oath of allegiance, like 
a vassal would have done to his liege lord in medieval times. The second type of 
consent that is legitimating is partaking in negotiations and consultations with the 
ruler that result in some form of agreement. In this kind of action there is no 
choice of who the superior will be, but still carries with it both that the subject is 
committed to the agreement and simultaneously acknowledging the superiority of 
the ruler. The third mode is public acclamation by a monarch or a popular leader 
through mass rallies or coronation ceremonies. This mode will take an important 
role in the analysis in this thesis. Beetham calls this kind of mass expression of 
consent for the “mobilisation mode” (Beetham, 1991:92-94). Huge numbers, 
sometimes larger parts of the population, as in revolutionary movements, are 
mobilised into collective actions, like campaigns or public rituals that legitimates 
the power relationship. 
Lane (1984) has investigated the role of rituals and ceremonies for creating 
legitimacy in the Soviet Union. She argues that rituals and ceremonies, both great 
public spectacles but also more personal rituals that referred to the socialist 
ideology and tradition became an important practice for maintaining legitimacy 
under late-socialism. This theory of ritualistic practises complements Beetham’s 
concept of legitimation under the mobilisation mode well to understand how 
legitimation practises work in a Chinese context.  
In the mobilisation mode of consent popular participation in politics is 
divorced from the process of appointing office-holders. Instead, Beetham stresses 
that legitimation is established from participation in execution of policy and point 
to the fact that citizens in Soviet-style societies are more politically active than in 
liberal democracies. Beetham characterises the constituencies under mobilisation 
mode as being more concerned with “low” rather than “high” politics (Beetham, 
1991:156). 
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The effectiveness of the legitimating process is dependent on the commitment 
of the people involved. The ruler’s ability to mobilise people around a cause or a 
belief system is central to the mobilisation mode of consent. The lack of 
democratic elections or freedom of speech etc. is not what poses challenges to 
legitimacy under the mobilisation mode. But rather if the belief system or belief in 
the cause is eroding. If the beliefs and values that justify the system are worn 
down or become obsolete the system will only be one where the few are 
privileged and the majority is repressed (Beetham, 1991:157). An erosion of 
confidence in the cause is of course much harder to map than restrictions of 
democratic freedoms, but amassed over time such developments should be 
detectable to the attentive observer. 
Again, the critic of this approach could claim that it is not a legitimate form of 
expressing consent since the subjects maybe coerced into partaking or that they 
lack a choice of whom to legitimate. But then one misses what is important about 
these actions. As stated before it is not the underlying intention of the act that 
determines if it is legitimating or not. It is the act in itself. The act is still 
legitimating whether the subject feels enthusiastic about the cause, are partaking 
willingly or if one is not. It is also near impossible to assess this from outside a 
society. Again, how consent is understood and expressed thus varies over time 
and between societies and cannot be absolutely determined in a universal way.  
However, there is one similarity between the liberal mode and the 
mobilisation modes of legitimation. They both depend on a form of mass 
mobilisation, and thus in this case mass legitimation. Like modern liberal 
democracies, the communist regime in China is based on the fundament of 
popular sovereignty (Zhu, 2011). Rather than being an anomaly or exception to 
modernity, mass dictatorships that relies on voluntary mass participation and 
support is a type of modernity (Lim, 2013:13-14). The level of mass mobilisation 
of course takes various forms depending on the type of government. But the 
notion that the ruler in some way should represent the people has been a powerful 
norm since the 19th century and structures modern political life. Since The 
People’s Republic of China is sprung from a communist revolution, the 
mobilisation mode of legitimacy will take an important role in the analysis.  
In order to appear legitimate a power relation must satisfy the criteria 
mentioned above: compliance to established rules, that the rules are based on 
accepted norms and that the subordinate shows demonstrable expression of 
consent. These criteria can of course be met to a varying degree. In all societies 
there are people who do not agree with the rules and norms of the majority and 
rulers who exceed their authority. In order to determine whether power is 
exercised legitimately one must only ascertain how extensive these deviations are. 
According to Beetham, the analytical tools that he offers are universally 
applicable over time and space (Beetham, 1991:21). I find his analysis of the 
concept of legitimacy very useful and especially his third level, popular 
demonstrable expression of consent, will inform the analysis of the Chinese case.  
There is one further point to be made that has great significance for our 
understanding of legitimation practises. Beetham means that when people agree to 
subordinate position in a power relation they also confirm the rules that determine 
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the necessity of their subordination (Beetham, 1991:96-97). This means that the 
established forms of rules of power structures the incentives for people to enter 
into power relations where they are subordinate. The peasants in Fanshen village 
during the Chinese revolution exemplifies this dilemma. “If the landowners did 
not let us rent the land, we would starve” (Hinton quoted in Beetham, 1991:83). 
By submitting to this logic, the established forms of power are reconfirmed and 
entrenched. Since the powerful set the rules of the game, the established form of 
power can remain. This is even the case, but maybe less rigid, in liberal 
democracies because of the ways that for example gender and class structures the 
political domain. Such power structures makes the system resistant to change, 
which also has effects for how power relations are legitimated by subordinates 
and must be taken into account in the analysis of legitimacy. Established power 
structures are laying down the possible ways for how the regime can be 
legitimated. This is also true for liberal democracies e.g. by electoral rules or how 
contracts between employer and employee are structured. The point that Beetham 
makes is even more important to consider when analysing legitimacy in an 
authoritarian setting. In this case, the powerful can almost exercise monopoly on 
how the citizens can legitimate the power relation. But this is not to say that 
authoritarian states can do without legitimacy.  
Regardless of being in a democratic or authoritarian setting, Beetham shows 
that legitimacy is a relational concept. It is created in the interactions between 
ruler and subjects through a complex web of values. If legitimacy is understood as 
a relational concept we cannot simply focus on the “output” or “input” side of 
legitimacy; the public “goods” that governments create or the following of 
established rules, justness of the acquiring of power etc. 
2.1.4 Consumption as legitimation 
While truly comprehensive, Beetham’s approach misses out on one dimension of 
political behaviour that has gained increased interest by researchers in recent 
decades, namely political consumerism. Even though political consumerism is not 
a new way of achieving political goals (Stolle, et al., 2009:246), it is probably 
unfair to say that Beetham neglected or forgot to theorise consumerism since it is 
such a new research topic. However, I would like to add the aspect of political 
consumerism to Beetham’s model for popular legitimation and discuss 
consumption as a form of “expression of consent”. 
There has been a notable decline of civic participation in political parties, 
voluntary associations and other forms of conventional political participation in 
Western democracies. The decline is attributed to what is referred to “post-
materialism” or “post-modernism”1. That is the rise of individualism, lack in faith 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Even though I am sceptical towards the concept post-modernity, because it implies that the world somehow has 
transcended modernity (and the need to satisfy material needs) as historic period, which I think is wrong, I still 
refer to it here because it is widely used in the literature on political consumerism.  
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in traditional political institutions, identity politics etc. But instead of lamenting 
this as the death of democracy, some scholars has turned to identify other forms of 
political participation and activism, where political consumerism being one of 
them (Stolle et al., 2005; Marien et al., 2010; Willis, 2012).  
Survey data shows that an increasing amount of people in Western 
democracies turn to the market to express political or moral concerns. And studies 
have shown that this practise also can be effective in achieving political goals 
(Stolle et al., 2005). By doing so, they create another sphere for political action 
that is separated from the more traditional spheres of political life.  
Consumption of certain products is also important for political identities of 
citizens. Actors who want to set a political agenda can draw on these identities for 
mobilisation to their cause. “Narrative storylines” of a political or ethical cause 
are created that gives consumers a sense of political agency. (Clarke et al., 
2007:234-5). The “narratives” that surround actions of consumption or boycott 
makes it more than just an act of buying something or not. Buying a product or 
refraining from doing so can thus be loaded with political meaning. That is also 
the case with legitimacy and legitimation. By purchasing (or boycotting) a 
product, the consumer activist commits an actions that is conveying legitimacy to 
the cause which is represented in the narrative.  
However, the studies mentioned above are focusing on democracies and the 
concept of democracy. Is political consumerism also relevant in a discussion on 
legitimation in an authoritarian society? The studies cited above state that 
traditional forms of political participation is declining in Western democracies and 
that political consumerism is one of the other many forms of political participation 
that has come to replace them to some extent. In societies where traditional liberal 
forms of political participation are not part of political life, or are thwarted by the 
state, other forms and fora, like the marketplace, can be an opportunity for 
political action. This argument should not be confused with the modernisation-
theory’s argument that liberal market economy leads to democratisation. The 
point is that the market can allow for forms of political participation for citizens, 
without meeting any criteria of democracy or liberalism, or that democracy is the 
goal for such actions. Marien et al. (2009) stresses that it is important to 
acknowledge that not all citizens are acting as equals under political consumerism. 
People with higher education and income are more influential in this domain, 
which is the case in both democracies and autocracies.  
Chinese society has also experienced what has been described as “post-
modernisation”; the effects of globalised economy, increased individualism and 
disinterest in the politics of the government. But this does not make them 
politically passive. Liu (2012) argues that political activism and participation 
among young people takes similar form in China as it does in the “post-
modernised” Western countries. This assertion demands a broader concept of 
political participation in China, as has already happened in the West. Studying 
how political consumerism works as a form of political participation in an 
authoritarian society such as China can show us how legitimation can function in 
a non-democratic setting.   
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Buying a consumer product thus functions as a way of conveying legitimacy 
to that product’s brand, but also to a political cause that the product is connected 
with through narrative. The opposite is of course true for a boycott. The fact that 
the decision to buy something is “voluntary” also makes it appealing to analyse it 
as an action of “expression of consent”. It is a practise that can have both 
symbolical and practical consequences.  
2.2 From theory to data 
What kind of material allows itself to be read as legitimations? China has almost 
no kind of process that legitimises the rule of the party in any way that would 
qualify as legitimating in democratic societies. Therefore we have to look for 
other types of legitimating actions. But what type of actions can be viewed as 
legitimating in the context of China? This thesis will approach this question with 
Beetham’s categories of “demonstrable expression of consent” and use them to 
identify practises that can be understood as legitimating. Consent, as was 
discussed above, should not be understood as a concept that has a universal 
definition but varies across time and space. 
In the modern age, since the introduction of the concept of popular 
sovereignty, mass expressions of consent is perhaps the most important form of 
legitimation. That is the case in all democratic societies and most authoritarian 
states. Since the People’s Republic of China was created from a revolutionary 
movement, popular mass movements and rallies has been an important part of 
everyday political life in China for both subjects and rulers. The rallies and 
campaigns that engaged huge numbers of people are therefore easily read as 
actions conferring legitimacy to the party and Chairman Mao. These kinds of 
activities will play an important part in the analysis. 
Beetham’s three modes of expressing consent and thus conferring legitimacy 
to the power-relation as a subject/citizen are swearing an oath, forming 
agreements with the ruler, and mass mobilisation. Focus will be on the mass 
mobilisation mode in this thesis, especially in the section on the Cultural 
Revolution. The characteristics of mass mobilisation is easily found during the 
Mao era. Mass mobilisation involves large parts of the population in different 
campaigns and events. Mass rallies where the rulering part is celebrated is the 
obvious “operationalisation” of the mobilisation mode of expressed consent. But 
Beetham also stresses the importance of the people’s participation in the 
implementation of policy. It is not only the state officials that are called upon 
when something needs doing. Where large parts of the population is encouraged 
to participate in policy campaigns, the actions of the people will be read as actions 
of demonstrable expressions of consent in the analysis, and thus a form of 
legitimation.  
But since mass mobilisation has lost much of its importance in contemporary 
China, other modes of expressions of consent must be identified for analysing 
legitimating practices in present day China. These practises can be such that are 
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part of everyday life but that still carries political connotations. Commercial 
tourism to and citizen activism concerning territorially disputed islands in the East 
and South China Sea can be read as examples of legitimation through political 
consumerism. 
In the case of political consumerism it is important to separate it from normal 
consumption when analysing as legitimation. What is typical for political 
consumerism is that the act of buying or boycotting certain products has become a 
part of a broader political narrative. To buy something or boycotting it can be 
loaded with political meaning and presents a form of political agency. The 
consumption or boycotting of politicised wares is thus a form of popular 
legitimation. It is on the author to argue for which products are a part of a 
narrative and how the connections are established.  
The practises that Beetham identifies as legitimation in the non-democratic 
setting, are often surrounded by ceremonials heavily laden with symbolic 
meanings. Political rituals that can be included in an legitimacy analysis must be 
public in some way, refer to official ideology or doctrine and be held at times or 
on places of heightened significance. These criteria should be met if an event can 
be categorised as legitimation under the mobilisation mode.  
However, it is important to note that simply living in a society and complying 
with its laws cannot suffice as evidence for demonstrable expressed consent and 
therefor it cannot be legitimating. The examples above can be viewed as 
legitimating because they are the result of government policy; not as binding law 
but as an opening up of a space for action and activism. This is not compliance, 
since that is unable to produce full legitimacy, but it is an opportunity for action 
that none the less has been made possible by the communist party. The subjects 
are not forced to partake in legitimating activities. As such, according to Beetham, 
they contain more powerful legitimating force than if they were involuntary 
(1991:95). 
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3 Materials and Methods 
In this section the method of analysis and materials will be discussed. Some meta-
theoretical positions concerning meaning and action will be discussed in order to 
(hopefully) make the analysis of the material clear and transparent. The point that 
are made in the very abstract section are then followed by a more “hands-on” 
approach to method. 
In this thesis I will discuss some islands that are the focus of territorial 
disputes between China and other South East and East Asian countries. I make no 
claim of determining the rightfulness of any territorial claim, but since the names 
of these islands are a part of these disputes they demand a comment. In Chinese 
quotes I will transcribe the name into pinyin, which has become the standard 
transliterating Chinese into the Latin alphabet. Otherwise I will call these places 
by their English name but for the case of Pinnacle Islands that will be called 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands because it is more familiar to the general reader than its 
English name and because Pinnacle is a direct translation of the Japanese 
Senkaku. The ordering of the names into Diaoyu/Senkaku is alphabetical and 
nothing else. In the case of Chinese personal names the family name comes first, 
followed by the personal name.  
3.1 … but first some meta-theory 
In the theory section I tried to grapple with the concepts of intention and action in 
relation to legitimacy. With Beetham’s help I argued that it is not the intention of 
the acting subject that is important for legitimation, but it is the action in itself. In 
this section I will go deeper into that argument. Legitimacy is not something that 
is material or measurable in an unproblematic way, but it is something that is 
created in the social world, in the relation between governor and governed. In that 
sense it can be seen as a form of meaning that is neither private nor totally 
objectively determinable. To legitimate can be seen as a form of politically 
meaningful behaviour. And to do actions that are legitimating is a way to create 
political meaning.  
Is meaning something that is subordinated to subjective intentionality? And 
how is the relationship between subjective and objective meaning? These 
questions scholars of the “interpretivist”2 school have tried to grappled with for a 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 I choose “interpretivist” here before post-positivism/post-empiricism that are also common in the literature. I 
agree with Yanow (2003:228) that the underlying philosophical arguments of the interpretivist school of political 
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long time. Hendrik Wagenaar identifies it as the problem of how to connect 
subjective consciousness with the world in a convincing manner (Wagenaar, 
2011:57). How can inner experience be connected with the outer social structure, 
and on the other hand, how can one retain agency within a discursive framework 
without falling into naïve realism or determinism, are questions that Wagenaar 
tries to solve.  
Wagenaar proposes an approach which he calls interventionist. When we are 
acting the world “talks back”, it has impact on us and it is something we must 
handle. “That is reality” he states (2011:60, italics in original). In this approach to 
meaning, structures or discourses are an emergent property of the interactions 
between individual actors. They are not so much the intentional outcomes of the 
actors but more the contingent and unintended consequences that emerge from the 
actions. In this way actors are producing structure but they cannot choose them. 
The interventionist approach acknowledge that agency and structure are 
ontologically different but they are not uncoupled (2011:61). Structure is thus 
both working as opportunity and constraint for agency. And meaning comes about 
when actors act in structural settings.  
To approach legitimacy and consent through intention produces more 
questions than answers because its assumptions about voluntariness and meanings 
behind actions. It views the acting subject as distinct from discourse, where the 
meaning of an action and its intention exists prior to discourse. But, all actions 
take place in relation to a context or discourse. In the meeting between 
action/utterance and discourse meaning is created. That means that the meaning of 
an action is not determined before it takes place in discourse. The meaning of 
utterances and actions and discourse are created and reproduced simultaneously. 
We can thus not claim that meaning cannot be a meaningful concept in any 
private sense, which is also then true for legitimacy. 
Legitimacy can thus be seen as created in the interaction between individual 
actions and structure. The structure both presents opportunities and limitations for 
how legitimacy is created. At the same time, actions that are analysed as 
legitimating in this thesis are not limited or closed to meaning only as being 
legitimating, but can contain various meanings.   
3.2 Materials and Methods 
The method of this thesis is tightly coupled with the theory. Rather than being 
treated as a mere tool, separate from theory and picked from the methodological 
“toolbox”, the method, theory and meta-theory (ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions) form parts of a whole. The methodological choices are thus 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
science stands on its own, without any reference to positivism or formulating itself in an antagonistic 
relationship to it.  
  19 
grounded in these presuppositions rather than forming a separate part (Yanow, 
2003).  
Since the aim of this thesis not is to determine whether the Chinese regime is 
perceived as legitimate or not by its populace, I do not make any claim as to 
present the two examples as representative of a general Chinese experience of 
legitimacy. By looking at carefully selected data I aim to support the argument 
that even non-democratic regimes like China relies on popular legitimation for its 
legitimacy. And by closely investigating this material I try to show how this can 
be done. 
In this thesis two separate examples will be investigated. The first is the early 
years of the Cultural Revolution. The other is what I will call the political 
consumerism that has developed around territorial disputes. The reasons for 
exemplifying a theory of legitimation with two such fundamentally different 
phenomena are many. The Cultural Revolution, well covered by historians, has 
been somewhat ignored by political scientists. This is a strange fact because it is 
such an important period of Chinese modern history. The same is true for political 
consumerism that has been widely studied and theorised in democratic societies 
but otherwise forgotten in the study of dictatorships and their like.  
To compare a society historically with itself also has the advantage that one 
can observe continuities and shifts over time. By doing so we can hopefully trace 
a development of how legitimation is expressed in China and compare different 
expressions with each other and understand them better in relation to their 
historical context.  
Moreover, the Cultural Revolution is often described as a deep legitimacy 
crisis for the Chinese regime. As such, it functions as a “hard case” for showing 
how legitimation still was important during that time. At the same time, the period 
of the Cultural Revolution may also let us touch the limit of what can be deemed 
as legitimation through “expression of consent”. The fact that some of the 
practises that we will look at became so all permeating part of daily life 
potentially causes it to lose its legitimating force. 
The two examples have different function in my argument. The selection of 
these examples is based on the theoretical argument I want to make. The Cultural 
Revolution’s early years exemplify how a Beethamian theory for analysing 
legitimation works in practise. I am thus applying Beetham’s theory to a new 
material. The example of consumerism connected to territorial disputes functions 
as a way to show how political consumerism is a new way for legitimating a 
power structure. It is in this part my theoretical contribution lies.  
The selection of data is also of course dependent on the argument I wish to 
make in this thesis. Since it is the activities of subordinates that are the focus here, 
the material that is chosen should have emanated from the people themselves 
rather than being a product of the regime. The material is only public material and 
the aim is to present material that is representative for the general context. I will 
not focus on the abnormal or extravagant. For the contemporary example of 
consumerism I have chosen to rely on internet material because it is public for all 
who has an internet connection. The material must be public in order to qualify as 
legitimating. Private texts like diaries cannot have any legitimating force. I have 
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looked at user generated content on blogs because it has the advantage of being 
made by ordinary people, and not produced and edited by an editorial board. 
The content is of course also vital. I have chosen material that in some way 
express positive sentiment about the government or government policy. In the 
case of political consumerism, I have chosen to look at a material that is 
connected to the nationalist discourse around the territorial disputes with Japan 
and other of China’s neighbours. When analysing the practises during the Cultural 
Revolution I have selected material that also is generated at the grassroots level, 
like Red Guard newsletters. But I am also analysing mass rallies and rituals that 
was created by the people to express loyalty to Mao and his cause. Both form and 
content can thus be analysed as conveying legitimacy to the power structure. 
The material is analysed in relation to the political environment it is present in. 
The political discourse forms a background against which the potential 
legitimation is formulated. In the beginning of the separate sections, where the 
theory is exemplified, the political discourse is explained to give the reader an 
understanding of what kind of background that structures the meaning of the 
legitimating actions analysed.  
In the analysis I look on whose voice is heard in the material and in which 
forum this is expressed. The analysis is also concerned with what kind of form the 
legitimation action is expressed in. The spatial aspect is also included in the 
analysis. The places where legitimating actions are committed that have a 
heightened political significance adds even more power to the legitimating force 
of the action.    
Some of the material that is analysed in this thesis is in Chinese and the 
translations will mainly be by the author if nothing else is indicated. A part of the 
material is made up by newspaper articles and other forms of traditional text 
media. But the focus of this thesis also allows analysis of materials that are not so 
often included in political science research. Examples of that are Red Guard 
newsletters and reports, travel guides and travel agents’ webpages, online material 
like “tweets”, blogs etc. Hopefully, these types of material can add interesting 
perspectives to the analysis. However, for the section on the Cultural Revolution I 
am greatly indebted to the work of Daniel Leese (2011) and Rodrick MacFarquhar 
& Michael Schoenhals (2006). This means that much of the material that is 
analysed in the chapter on the Cultural Revolution is already selected by these 
authors. 
The relationship between the Chinese citizen as agent and the context 
illuminates the tensions of structure and agency that was discussed above. The 
structure, or objective meaning, is both set up by the government’s laws, rules and 
policies, and the unwritten norms of Chinese society. The agent that acts in this 
context experience both restrictions and affordances, either perceived or 
unconsciously. And meaning, in this case legitimation, arises in that interaction. 
Legitimacy is not formed prior to its enactment as separate from discourse. It is 
constructed in the interplay between discourse and action. In that way, meaning is 
both open-ended and provisional.  
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4 Revolutionary legitimation 
To include an example like the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-
1976 for an analysis of legitimating practises might seem odd, or even possibly 
provoking to some. The decade during which it occurred was marked by political 
chaos, extreme violence and utter destruction of party legitimacy. It was such a 
politically significant event that it has been called “the most extraordinary event in 
China’s post-revolutionary history” (Weatherley, 2006:58), and a “watershed, the 
defining decade of half a century of Communist rule in China” (MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals, 2006:1). Even though the CCP suffered a crisis in legitimacy and 
chaos reigned in many parts of the country, I argue that legitimating practises by 
ordinary people was still conducted. These practises will be analysed as what 
Beetham calls “expression of consent” according to the theoretical discussion 
above. The masses took a very active role, which was the aim of the movement, 
especially students, and they were not merely passive recipients of Mao’s policies.  
This chapter will begin with a brief summary of the twists and turns of the first 
years of the turbulent decade. I rely on the detailed work by MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals Mao’s Last Revolution to give an historic overview of the early years 
of the Cultural Revolution. The reader should keep in mind that this summary is 
very brief and selective. I have selected events that form a relevant backdrop for 
understanding the legitimating practises that are discussed in the analysis 
following the historic summary. Leese makes a useful periodization of the 
Cultural Revolution by splitting it up in the Red Guard phase from 1966 to 1968, 
followed by a period of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) dominance between 
1969 and 1971, the year that Lin Biao died, and the period of the years 1972 up 
until 1976 which has been dubbed “twilight of the Cultural Revolution” (2011:23-
4). This analysis will be focused on the Red Guard phase of the revolution 
because at that time grassroots engagement in the movement was highest and 
most enthusiastic.  
4.1 “Bombard the Headquarter” 
The initiation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution must be understood 
through complex domestic and foreign developments and Mao’s reactions to 
these. MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2006) gives an account of the main reasons 
for Mao, who was indeed responsible for its enactment, to start a revolution that 
proved to be modern China’s greatest political disasters. One of these was Mao’s 
obsession with revisionism and the ideological developments he observed in 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin. Mao’s heir apparent Liu Shaoqi, who was to 
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become the main target of the Cultural Revolution, had differing opinions on how 
the famine and economic chaos of the Great Leap Forward should be handled. 
The Socialist Education Movement campaign, that was restore China’s economy 
by ridding the party of corrupt rural cadres and regain the peasant’s confidence, 
was led by Liu in a too revisionist way for Mao’s taste. The course the campaign 
took was opening up a door for the restoration of capitalism and the abolishment 
communal farming Mao thought (2006:3-8). MacFarquhar & Schoenhals also 
suggests that Mao feared that he would face the same fate as Stalin, to be defamed 
after death, or even Khrushchev, who was toppled in 1964 by his colleagues 
(2006:9). This gave Mao the reason to turn outside the party, where Liu had a 
strong base, to rid himself of his potential rival. 
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution began in late 1965 as a seemingly 
just another run-of-the-mill academic dispute in party press. Beijing academic Wu 
Han, who enjoyed the protection of Beijing party boss Peng Zhen, were accused 
for spreading contra-revolutionary ideas in his plays. But the attack was secretly 
instigated by Mao, and when Peng failed to denounce Wu he too was targeted and 
unseated (2006:15-20, 32-34). 
The PLA Chief of staff was also criticised and dismissed from office on 
grounds of political incorrectness and was replaced with Lin Biao, who was to 
become Mao’s closest ally during the Cultural Revolution. By doing this the 
Beijing party apparat was incapacitated and PLA ties to the CCP was severed and 
Mao could use it as a powerbase to attack his rivals in the party. Mao then turned 
to the educational institutions for carrying out the next phase of his revolution.  
Leftist academics in Beijing University who earlier had been attacked by Peng 
Zhen sensed that the Beijing party top was in trouble. They produced the Cultural 
Revolution’s first “Big Character Poster”, the media which was to become the 
main way for the masses to attack the establishment, in which they criticised the 
school’s party secretariat. When Mao expressed liking toward the poster it was 
published in People’s Daily with a praising comment (2006:58). Posters like this 
was by then plastered all over campus and at other schools, and students started to 
make their own posters. The Red Guard movement started in Beijing’s elite 
schools where students took upon themselves to defend the Chairman and Mao 
Zedong-Thought. MacFarquhar & Schoenhals suggests that the reason for that the 
Red Guard movement started in elite schools was that the children in these 
schools, being the daughters and sons of top party cadres, had access to classified 
party documents at home. They therefore had a direct insight into Mao’s 
directives that other people lacked (2006:104). 
The commotion that the ousting of Peng Zhen had caused made many schools 
to be suspended, and after the publication of the Big Character Poster all Beijing 
schools cancelled classes. Noisy demonstrations in support of Mao was held all 
over the city and the enthusiastic masses soon turned a bit too rowdy for the taste 
of the CCP leadership. However, the military and police were forbidden to 
intervene by Lin Biao. This irritated Liu Shaoqi who dispatched so called work 
teams, which was standard procedure when problems of implementation occurred, 
to the campuses and schools to control the revolutionaries. Of course, the work 
teams was not popular with the Red Guards and they were in constant conflict.  
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At this initial phase of the Cultural Revolution, Mao was not in Beijing and 
was seldom reachable by his colleagues. Therefor his position on the unruly Red 
Guards and the direction that the Cultural Revolution had taken was unfamiliar to 
Liu Shaoqi and others, which probably was Mao’s intention. Upon return to 
Beijing he condemned the work teams and the ones who had dispatched them. At 
the same time he lauded the Big Character Poster from Beijing University and its 
commentary in People’s Daily. Early opposition to the work teams were 
celebrated as heroic rebels, and the supporters were branded as conservatives 
(2006:85).  It was then clear that Mao was going to use the work teams as excuse 
for purging the party top with help from the Red Guard movement (2006:91). He 
declared his declaration of war on the party elite in an article that was to be 
published in People’s Daily and was titled “Bombard the Headquarter – My Big 
Character Poster”. When Mao had given the Red Guards his support, the Red 
Guard movement really took off (2006:106).  
Beijing Red Guards travelled the country and the movement spread to wider 
parts of China. Students and teachers who now were free from school also flowed 
to the capital to learn from their revolutionary peers. It became official policy to 
encourage people to come to Beijing and huge mass rallies where held in 
Tiananmen Square where they could behold Mao and other prominent leaders in 
the party top. 
The main aim for the Red Guards was the destruction of the “four olds”, 
namely “old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes” 
(2006:113). The Red Guard took to this task with great fervour. Temples, relics 
and other invaluable cultural objects and places were smashed and burned. In 
Beijing, by the end of the Cultural Revolution 4,922 of about seven thousand 
officially designated “places of cultural and historical interest” had been destroyed 
(2006:118). But the Red Guards’ revolutionary enthusiasm were not limited to 
mere symbolical destruction. In the summer of 1966 Red Guards began looting 
and destroying the homes of people with “bad” class background, confiscating 
valuables and humiliating, or worse, its inhabitants. 
But the destruction of cultural relics and sacking of bourgeoisie homes were 
not the most horrifying violent acts during the Cultural Revolution. Red Guards 
started to organise their own mass meetings where alleged class enemies and other 
bad elements were “struggled”; a form of public humiliation. Many of those who 
were targeted by the ire of the Red Guards committed suicide. Others were simply 
beaten to death. In Beijing alone, 1,722 where murdered in August and September 
1966. The violence was probably enabled by the fact that the police were 
forbidden to intervene with the Red Guards, but were actually told to support 
them (2006:124-5).  
Different Red Guard factions also started to conduct lethal gang warfare 
against each other in the streets and on campuses. The situation had turned too 
violent and unmanageable even for Mao’s liking. In October 1967 classes were 
resumed but the Red Guards were less than willing to give up their newly gained 
freedoms and position as the revolutionary vanguard; the chaos continued. In an 
attempt to quell the unruly students Mao utilised the same tactic that he earlier had 
condemned, namely work teams. However, these were met by violence upon 
  24 
entering the campuses, and at Tsinghua University five members of the work team 
sent there were killed (249). The leaders of the university Red Guards were 
summoned to a meeting with Mao and other party officials were he charged the 
Red Guards with alienating the population. PLA units moved into campuses to 
restore order. The Red Guards were dispersed and sent to the countryside to toil 
together with the peasants and workers in the fields, mines and factories. In total, 
12 million young people from the cities were sent out to labour and become 
“educated youths” (251). This marked the end of the Red Guard era and their “red 
terror”.  
4.2 “Political power grows out from the barrel of a 
gun” 
However chaotic and violent, the policies of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s 
person and leadership, and his theories were legitimated by large amounts of the 
populace. It probably right to assume that many of these practises were committed 
in fear of being branded as counterrevolutionary, and that has effects on the 
quality of the legitimating action, as Beetham argues. But there were also 
phenomena that were not necessarily structured through intimidation and fear. 
These need to be separated from each other. When Mao said that “political power 
grows out from the barrel of a gun” he was only partly right. To be able to enact 
his policies, he had to rely on its perceived legitimacy. By simple gun-pointing the 
Cultural Revolution never would have gone that far. However, this quote was to 
become very popular during the Cultural Revolution as a way of justifying the 
revolutionary violence that was committed. 
For Beetham’s concept of legitimacy, the third dimension, that of a 
“demonstrable expression of consent”, is very important as discussed above. 
Being faithful to Beetham, we cannot deduce genuine voluntariness from any 
action of legitimation, but that is not our goal. What is analysed is the action’s 
potential legitimating force as an action of an “expression of consent”. However, I 
think it is appropriate to discuss the Red Guards’ relationship to the party state 
and what role the government had in orchestrating their activities. If taking action 
is forced upon someone then it is hard to argue that it qualifies as an “expression 
of consent”. The legitimating power that such actions produce are anyhow weak 
and the ruler then solely relies on coercion. But the various institutionalised 
expressions of loyalty, or the information gathering and disseminating efforts 
were not forced upon the ambitious Red Guards. A space was opened for them, by 
the government, which gave them the opportunity, and they spontaneously 
occupied that new space.  
Because Mao used the Red Guards to purge the party of his rivals, the 
movement’s autonomy can be questioned. However, Xing (2011:213) argues the 
fact that they were called upon to initiate the Cultural Revolution is not enough to 
claim that they were totally manipulated and controlled (See also Zhao, 
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2008:197). What is really interesting here is their degree of relative autonomy. 
Schoenhals stresses the importance of acknowledging this, lest our understanding 
of the Cultural Revolution be distorted (Schoenhals, 2015). In the following 
sections I will provide two examples of what can be argued to qualify as 
legitimation actions by the Red Guards, students as well as workers. I will first 
discuss the newsgathering and disseminating activities that cropped up in the very 
early stage of the Cultural Revolution. I then turn to examine some legitimation 
actions in the sphere of popular culture (here “popular” as of the people rather 
than culture suited to or intended for the general masses of people). The purpose 
being to say something interesting about legitimacy as a theoretical concept and 
how that concept works in political life of ordinary people in an unordinary 
historical setting.  
4.2.1 A Great Proletarian Information Revolution 
Michael Schoenhals has called the phenomena of Red Guard newsletters and 
information networks “Chinas Great Information Revolution” (Schoenhals, 2015). 
The “information revolution” was that the young Red Guards could 
“independently collect, process, internally disseminate, and exchange 
information” in a way that for a brief period of time challenged the communist 
state’s information and propaganda monopoly in an unprecedented way 
(Schoenhals, 2015). Before the year of 1966, such organisation was branded 
contra-revolutionary and illegal.  
To their disposal they had hand-cranked mimeograph machines, motorcycles 
and sometimes even access to switchboard telephones. For example, the Red 
Guard faction called 3rd HQ in Beijing had a network of “liaison-stations” in 
about fifty cities around the country, that relayed news about what was going on 
in the country and the progress of the revolution; and sometimes even abroad. But 
even less sophisticated organisations like the East Wind Revolutionary Rebel HQ 
consisting of staff and workers in the machine industry in Beijing had its own 
internal newsletter which provided members with important news on what was 
going on both domestically and, on rare occasions, internationally. But the 
professionalism of the Red Guard organisations should not be exaggerated. The 
people working in the field were more like activists with a nose for gossip than 
true journalists and often they had to rely on personal connections to get hold of 
interesting information (Schoenhals, 2015).  
However, not only students produced and disseminated newsletters and 
journals. The “Headquarters of the Revolutionary Revolt of Shanghai Workers” 
published their own newspaper called Workers’ Rebelling. The circulation was 
30,000 copies in the beginning, but by the early 1970s it reached an impressive 
6,400,000 copies, exceeding the local party press organ (Xing, 2011:214).  
The purpose of the Red Guards and other revolutionary factions was to rid the 
party state apparat of “hidden representatives of the bourgeoisie” and “persons in 
power taking the capitalist road”, so in what way where their publications 
legitimating? The Cultural Revolution entailed a splitting of the CCP from Mao 
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and his clique of people who were supportive of the Cultural Revolution. This 
means that while the CCP was delegitimised, Mao’s person, his revolutionary 
movement and its leaders were legitimised by ordinary people. The fact is, had 
not the people conveyed legitimacy to Mao, and had Mao not been able to utilise 
that resource, the Cultural Revolution probably never would have taken place. 
This observation points to the reciprocity inherent in the concept of legitimacy. It 
is a fundamentally relational concept since the ruler relies on the legitimation 
from the people. The Cultural Revolution is a schoolbook example of Beetham’s 
definition of mass mobilisation mode of legitimacy. The people were relied on to 
carry out the policies. They are thus not merely receivers of policy. The Red 
Guard’s newsletters took the informational aspect into the legitimation movement. 
It is a form of legitimation under the mass mobilisation mode because the 
legitimation relies on the masses. The masses are publicly acclaiming the rulers 
right to rule and participate in the enactment of policy.   
Many of the newsletters had a box in the top right corner with “supreme 
instructions”, i.e. a Mao quote. By putting in quotations from Mao’s speeches and 
works in the text a kind of quotational legitimation. This practise is derived from 
that Mao Zedong-thought should direct all your actions, and all problems could be 
solved by applying his theories (Leese, 2011:198).  
The publication Red Peak Newsletter (Hong Feng Tongxun) was issued by 
students in Shanghai and to read it offers an interesting insight into what a rather 
professional looking newsletter could contain. On the first page of issue 19 from 
27 June 1967 there are news of the progress of the revolution around the country. 
The newsletter gives a glimpse of what was important for the revolutionaries at 
that time. In Lhasa, capital of Tibet, the newsletter reports that the “situation is 
very good, the area’s Party Committee Secretaries Zhou Renshan and Hao 
Pingnan have been exposed [as counter-revolutionaries] by Red Guards”. 
However the situation was described as more bleak in Hangzhou, capital of 
Zhejiang province.  
Hangzhou has been struck by a white terror, the Big Character Posters that Red Ferocity-
faction3 put up were instantly torn down. The Big Character Posters that ‘smashes Liu and 
criticises revisionism’ are extremely few, and all [other posters] are targeting Red Ferocity-
faction (Hong Feng Tongxun, 1967). 
But the newsletter also had updates on the struggle in the cultural sphere. “The 
Mao Zedong-Thought Propaganda Group in Beijing is setting up the play ‘The 
First Salvo’. The play is about the country’s first Marxist-Leninist Big Character 
Poster, [the play is written] by a new Beijing University playwright” (Ibid.). 
The short-lived newsletters, like this one, were conveying legitimacy to Mao’s 
cause in principally two ways which both can be seen as actions of “expression of 
consent”. For clarity I have divided them into form and content.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 Names alluding to violence, like these were certainly inspired by Mao’s recommendation to the young Red 
Guard Song Binbin to change her name from Binbin (suave) to Yaowu (be martial) (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 
2006:108). 
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In form they were part in implementing Mao’s policies during the Cultural 
Revolution. The people’s engagement in implementing the policy is a crucial 
feature of legitimacy in the mass mobilisation mode as characterised by Beetham. 
By circulating newsletters with information about Mao’s theories and views, and 
also the general development of the revolution, revolutionaries could be kept a 
jour and act according to the new developments.  Information is thus an important 
element in legitimation. The subordinate must have some idea as to how the cause 
or system can be legitimated. The spontaneously organised newsletters filled this 
function. The form of newsletters are also functioning as actions of legitimation 
because they validate the relation between the ruler and the ruled to those external 
to it.  
The second way it functions as legitimating is through the views and the 
language in the newsletters. This is not necessarily separated from the first aspect 
of popular implementation above, but allows for deeper discussion about the 
content. The newsletters constructs the different factions that are struggling 
against each other as either enemies, crooks and villains or heroes and 
revolutionaries. This is done through a set of terms and association with certain 
people in the leadership. The Shanghainese Red Guards who reported on the 
“white terror” in Hangzhou makes a telling example. “White terror” is a phrase 
that refers back to the violent suppression of communists in 1927. By using it, one 
invokes historic wrongdoings to create a sense of that the enemy is on the move 
and “we” have to strike back. The newsletter is painting up a picture of enemies of 
the revolution against the heroic resistance of the Red Ferocity-faction. The 
enemies are the supporters of Liu Shaoqi, the greatest crook of the Cultural 
Revolution according to the Red Guards; a typical “capitalist roader”. By 
attacking Mao’s rival, at least verbally, the Red Guards could show their support 
of Mao, and thus legitimating the movement against “people in the top taking the 
capitalist road”. The popular denunciation of Liu in its various forms was one way 
in which the masses could implement Mao’s revolutionary policy. Bereft of 
popular support and his power base in the party undermined, Liu was the first in 
the senior leadership to fall victim to the movement.  
Red Peak Newsletter reports enthusiastically about the developments in Lhasa, 
where the CCP secretariat has been “exposed”. From the revolutionaries’ point of 
view, this is very encouraging. The sole purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to 
attack the party establishment. To report on these news, and in that particular way, 
is a powerful way of showing where one’s loyalty lies. It was probably also 
important for the Red Guards to report on events that indicated that the revolution 
was on the right track. In this way the news reporting becomes a legitimating 
action in itself. By describing the events that are understood as taking the Cultural 
Revolution forward as positive, and at the same time describing the party’s efforts 
to curb the revolution as bad, even as “terror”, Mao’s policy is legitimated. This 
view is then easily proliferated among Red Guards who are hooked up on this 
information network. By being distributed, the newsletters contributed to bring the 
“mass” into “mass mobilisation”.  
The Shanghai Red Guard newsletter also points out that posters that “smashes 
Liu and criticises revisionism” (da Liu pi xiu) were extremely few in Hangzhou. 
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The ideological battlefield, when it did not materialise into actual armed clashes, 
was the walls of universities, schools and other public places. Big Character 
Posters became a very important medium for revolutionaries during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
To report on the Big Character Posters can be seen as a way of creating a 
community and a way of sharing inspiration nationally. Because the newsletters 
reported on the fact that Big Character Posters were put everywhere, they 
reprinted their content, and exchanged experiences of resistance, the community 
that was created could legitimate Mao in a more efficient way. The newsletters 
can be seen as having the function of spontaneous coordination between 
likeminded Red Guards and other revolutionaries. Because of this coordination, 
the legitimating force was greater than if the groups would have been separated by 
information blackouts. The fact that the newsletter outfits, their publications, form 
and content were not dictated by Mao or any other in the CCP also makes the 
legitimating force of the revolutionaries more potent. That is probably why the 
people who stood to lose from the Cultural Revolution were very hostile towards 
them. 
4.2.2 Ritualistic revolution 
The Cultural Revolution saw the birth of what often is described as a personality 
cult of Mao, complete with rituals, exegesis, followers and worshipping. While 
dressing the plethora of loyalty expressions towards Mao in religious terminology 
can be helpful for understanding the seemingly irrational and blind worship of 
Mao during these years, it simplifies some of its more complex aspects.  
The thing with the “cult” that makes it interesting from a legitimation 
perspective is that it did not have its origin in state initiatives but emerged at the 
grassroots level (Leese, 2011:135-6). Before the Cultural Revolution, Mao had 
strictly forbidden all expressions of excessive reverence and worship of his 
person; even celebrating his birthday (2011:145).  
But under the summer of 1966 that was about to change radically. Because 
students and teachers were free from school, many took the opportunity to travel 
to the capital, the centre of the Cultural Revolution and had been coming in large 
numbers since June. The Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG), the loose 
institution that was charged to conduct the revolution with Mao, did not like this 
very much, but Mao disagreed and in August the masses were urged to come to 
Beijing to meet the leader. (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 2006:106-7). This was 
the overture to what MacFarquhar & Schoenhals describes as eight “Nuremberg-
style rallies” held in Tiananmen Square (2006:107). But the Nazis would probably 
been consternated by the anarchic character of these events. For instance, on 
National Day rally when 1.5 million people attended, ten people were trampled to 
death and many injured (2006:109). The mass rallies gave an unprecedented 
chance for ordinary people to see the Chairman in the flesh. The eight rallies were 
totally attended by twelve million people (Leese, 2011:132).   
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But for most Red Guards who attended, the rallies were a very special 
occasion and a day to remember. A letter to his colleagues from twenty-six year 
old teacher Bei Guangcheng4 from Shanghai gives an insight into what kinds of 
feelings that were awaken when attending a mass rally and able to catch a glimpse 
of Mao himself.  
Let me tell you the great news, news greater than heaven. At five minutes past seven in the 
evening on the 15th of September 1966, I saw our most most most most dearly beloved 
leader Chairman Mao! Comrades, I have seen Chairman Mao! Today I am so happy my 
heart is about to burst. We’re shouting ‘Long live Chairman Mao! Long live! Long live!’ 
We’re jumping! We’re singing! After seeing the Red Sun in Our Hearts, I just ran around 
like crazy all over Beijing […] How can I possibly go to sleep tonight! I have decided to 
make today my birthday. Today I started a new life!!! (Bei, 1996 [1967]). 
The account of the star-struck young Red Guard shows how these mass rallies 
were very important for legitimating the Cultural Revolution. By attending, Mao 
gave the Red Guards his blessing in implementing the revolution, and by 
attending with their outmost fervour, the Red Guards conferred legitimacy to Mao 
and his cause. It was a very powerful display of public acclamation towards the 
leadership. These events were of course broadcasted around the country and 
showed to all how great popular support Mao enjoyed.  
But all legitimating rituals were not as grand a spectacle as the Beijing mass 
rallies. A curious practice developed to show one’s loyalty toward Chairman Mao 
was the “loyalty dance” and “quotation gymnastics”. This was a way to 
“thoroughly eradicate the revisionist sports line and to establish a revolutionary 
Mao Zedong sports line” (Shanghai Sports Headquarters Rising Corps “Chairman 
Mao Quotation Gymnastics” Creation Group, quoted in Leese, 2011:202). The 
different movements in the gymnastic choreography represented a word or a 
series of words making up a full story line. But the words to the choreography was 
not made up by the group. It was consisting of popular quotations from the 
Quotations from Chairman Mao (also called The Little Red Book) which all true 
revolutionaries carried on their person. The same group also created a “Wishing 
Chairman Mao Zedong Eternal Life Taijiquan” programme (Leese, 2011:204).  
The “cult” also started to become commodified. Kitschy Mao portraits or 
plastic red hearts with the character for “loyalty” imprinted on them, and even 
Mao-quotes collector cards could be bought. But the most common product 
associated with the cult was the Mao badge. Both public and private organisations 
produced these badges in absurd quantities (Leese 2011:211-5). To wear a badge 
became synonymous with revolutionary conviction. By wearing a Mao badge one 
could show one’s loyalty towards the Great Helmsman. Maybe this can be seen as 
an early form of political consumerism, anachronistically popping up at a time of 
greatest communist frenzy. The practice of wearing Mao badges gained popularity 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 Upon return to Shanghai Bei Guangcheng was accused for being a contra-revolutionary, severely beaten and 
humiliated by his student and colleagues which caused him to commit suicide that same day (“As We Saw Them 
Beat Him…, 1996 [1967]).  
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since July 1966. Buying and wearing a badge, like political pins today, shows 
your dedication to a cause. As such it works as legitimating for Mao’s person and 
his politics. The badges are very tightly connected with the Cultural Revolution 
narrative and it creates a political community, identifiable through visual 
properties, around the cause.  
Lane (1984) and Yurchak (2006) has argued for the role of socialist ritual for 
maintaining the regime’s rule and creating legitimacy in the Soviet Union. These 
socialist rituals embodied the Soviet official ideology. They varied from huge 
mass rallies to initiation rituals for individuals and were developed during the 
sixties and seventies (Lane, 1984:208). Lane argues that these rituals were created 
in order to gain acceptance for the soviet regime’s claim to authority by referring 
to tradition (1984:217). But the fact that the rituals that cropped up during the 
Cultural Revolution was created at the grassroots level makes them different from 
the top- down created rituals in the Soviet Union. The rituals that surrounded Mao 
were in many instances not created by the leadership but by ordinary citizens, like 
the quotation gymnastics.  
A report produced by “the Red Guard General Headquarters at Beijing Middle 
School No.64” from 13th April 1968 tells about the activities they are planning to 
implement a “Loyaltyfication of the whole day” (Yi ri zhongzihua). These young 
Red Guards are employing various kinds of rituals that were popular at the time to 
show loyalty towards the Great Helmsman (Beijing liushisi zhong hongweibing 
zongbu, 1968).  
The report begins with “Supreme Instructions”, as the newsletters also did: 
“The Chinese Communist Party governs the nuclear force of our undertakings. 
Marxism-Leninism guides the logical base of our thinking”. Supreme Instructions 
was always referring to a Mao quote; that went without saying. Following that is 
“instructions from Vice-chairman Lin Biao” which indicates that Lin Biao still 
was seen as Mao’s closest supporter at the time.  
The report addresses “Little Generals of the Red Guards, revolutionary 
teaching staff and fellow students” and begins with expressing that “we hold 
boundless warm love towards Chairman Mao”, and continues in the same tone 
half through the document before going on to the plans for implementing the 
“Loyaltyfication of the whole day”.  
The young Red Guards are proposing a creation of their own rituals around the 
starting and ending of the school day. “Upon entering the classroom: Salute 
Chairman Mao (When entering the first time)”. At the end of the last lesson, 
“when leaving the classroom: Salute Chairman Mao, sing “Sailing the Seas 
Depends on the Helmsman” (Dahai Hangxing Kao Duoshou). When roll calling 
in the morning, instead of answering with “here” the Red Guards propose that it is 
changed to “I wish Chairman Mao eternal life”, “Long live Chairman Mao” or 
“Serve the People”. When answering a question one should “first ask Chairman 
Mao for instructions, and when in the process of answering one should use 
quotations from Chairman Mao” (Ibid). 
This little report shows what absurd proportions these legitimation practices 
took at the end of the Red Guard-era. Mao was supposed to be present in every 
aspect of everyday life. The system of “asking for instructions and reporting 
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back” had been in use for a long time but it was a report of the experiences of a 
PLA unit who used it to unify two competing factions at a factory that started this 
ritual during the Cultural Revolution. They had added that one should look in Mao 
Zedong’s writings and speeches for instructions and to the system. 1967 the CCP 
Centre had issued Zhongfa5 [67] 350 that endorsed the new ritual as a model work 
strategy, and it became an officially backed formalistic worship of Chairman Mao 
(Leese, 2011:198). The ritual was thus initially formed as a disciplinary tool to 
pacify two factions, but because of “embedded” journalists at factories, the ritual 
was popularised and spread without direct directions from the Party or CCRG 
(2011:201). 
The way that the young Red Guards at Beijing 64th Middle School used the 
ritual of “asking for instructions” is a form of spontaneous public acclamation of 
the leader which then functions legitimating. They even could refer to a policy 
document from the highest instance to justify their practise. This points to the 
relational aspect of legitimation and legitimacy.  
But Leese points out that by 1968, to wear a Mao badge or not became a 
question of loyalty. This was in a time when appearing as not loyal to Mao could 
prove very dangerous. Of course, everyone wanted to wear a badge. What 
happens to the potential legitimating force then? If a practise becomes so 
widespread that it becomes almost compulsory that practise stops to be 
legitimating. It is so because it is harder to sort under the category of 
“demonstrable expression of consent”. If one needs to conform to some practises 
just to be able to live normally, it becomes a form of compliance, not legitimation. 
The hollowing of the legitimating force of the “asking for instructions”-system 
faced the same development. If it is compulsory to utter a set phrase whenever 
one opens one’s mouth to speak it becomes a sort of formalisation of normal 
language rather than proving ones dedication to a cause. To merely live in a 
society and abide by its norms cannot qualify as “demonstrable expression of 
consent”.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Zhongfa means simply “issued by the party centre”.  
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5 Consumer legitimacy 
In the beginning of this thesis the rise of nationalism in China was mentioned. The 
increasingly harsh nationalist discourse has been one way for the Chinese 
government to build legitimacy (Holbig & Gilley, 2010). The accounts that focus 
on nationalism among Chinese citizens has been mainly interested in nationalist 
expressions and activism online (Liu, 2006; Zhang, 2013; Liu, 2014). In these 
accounts, overly enthusiastic nationalists is portrayed as a problem for the Chinese 
government. And it is a fact that the CCP censorship apparat effectively removes 
all calls for nationalist demonstrations from the web, even though it supports state 
policy (King et al., 2013); a fact that support the view that it is seen as a problem 
for the leadership. However, that might not be because of the nationalist content 
but out of fear that people will learn collectively how to mobilise public protests 
in general. But, the particular legitimation aspect on the behalf of the people is 
unfortunately neglected. While anti-Japanese riots and similar phenomena are 
posing a challenge to the government’s goal of a “harmonious society”, there are 
other, less drastic forms of popular nationalism and patriotism that can be 
analysed from a legitimation perspective.  
A lot of nationalistic activism, both on- and offline, revolves around China’s 
territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea. It is particularly the islands 
Diaoyu/Senkaku, the Paracel Islands and Spratley Islands. 
With this nationalistic discourse of territory as background, there has cropped 
up various different kinds of products and merchandise. In a mix of capitalism and 
nationalism, this patriotic consumerism can be seen as offering the Chinese people 
an alternative route to participate in national politics. Through consumption and 
boycott, the Chinese citizen is again given the opportunity to help enact the 
government’s policy; one of the important aspects of mass mobilisation. But this 
is a mass mobilisation of the late-modern society where Mao-style mass 
campaigns and rallies have become obsolete.  
5.1 Territorial tourism 
China has long asserted sovereignty claim over the tiny islands and shoals in the 
South China Sea, the so called U-line, of which Paracel Islands make up its 
western part. The Paracel Islands are also claimed by Vietnam. The sources that 
China has brought to the table is old texts that try to describe the islands and its 
location in order for captains to avoid the danger the islands and shoals pose to 
their ships, rather than mentioning them as a part of China or Chinese. During the 
19th and 20th century the islands has been either totally ignored, or at sometimes 
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claimed by various regional and colonial powers as its strategic value has 
fluctuated. Since 1974, when South Vietnam’s military expedition to the islands 
was fought down by the PLA Navy6, China has exercised military control over the 
Paracel Islands. But the issue has not yet been settled internationally (Tonnesson, 
2002:6-16).   
The claim to the islands in the South China Sea, the military activity there, and 
the building of new islands in the area makes up an important part of Chinese 
foreign policy (Sanger & Gladstone, 2015). Not only in relation to its regional 
neighbours, but also in relation to the US which has allies in the region. The 
Islands where for long closed off for civilians and the waters where only visited 
by military vessels. However, the islands was opened to tourists in year 2013, 
making this a quite new phenomena and adding interesting features to the politics 
surrounding the disputed archipelago. (Tian, 2013)  
It is quite expensive to buy a five day cruise to the Paracel Islands. Prices 
range from 4.000 yuan to 15.000 yuan (Xisha Lüyou). Given that the annual 
average income of urban resident in China was about 51500 yuan (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China), it must be considered an expensive five day leisure 
trip. 
Out of the five day cruise, only two days are spent on the islands since it is 
quite far from Hainan where the tours depart from. The tourists sleeps every night 
on board and eat all their meals on the boat. However, the program is intense so 
that the tourist can make the most out of their trip. On the third day of the cruise 
they reach the first island in the archipelago called Yinyu. On the travel agents 
webpage you can read a detailed program of the tour. After breakfast the tourists 
disembark on the island and conduct “patriotic activities”, consisting of “raising 
the flag and singing the national anthem, swearing an oath of allegiance and 
collecting souvenirs together” (Xisha Lüyou). 
The “patriotic activities” makes up an important part in the selling of the 
cruise. This fact make this kind of consumption tightly coupled with political 
significance. Swimming, deep sea fishing and other traditional tourist activities, 
which could be done in and around Hainan, a popular resort in China for Chinese 
tourists, seems to be secondary feature of the cruise. Actual time spent ashore is 
also quite low in comparison to the time spent on board the ship. Furthermore, it 
is an expensive journey with Chinese measures. This seems to point at that both 
the feeling of exclusiveness and political significance of being on the Paracel 
Islands are the main attractions of the cruise. 
It is not only the outspokenly “patriotic activities” that carries important 
political implications. Just the fact that you in person can be on and around the 
disputed islands carries political significance. This becomes clear if we compare 
with the activism concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. One of the main goals 
of the League for the Defence of Diaoyu Islands is to go to the island and 
disembark. When they managed to accomplish this it was seen as a huge feat 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 These events makes up the plot of the 1976 movie South China Sea Turmoil mentioned in the introduction. 
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(Zhongguo Minjian Baodiao Lianhehui). To be on the islands as a Chinese citizen 
is symbolically very important.  
When turning away from the travel agent’s sales pitch toward someone who 
has experienced the cruise first hand, more interesting aspects of the political 
significance of this practise emerge. Travel blogs gives an interesting insight to 
what Chinese tourists experience themselves when going to the Paracel Islands. 
One woman’s post on a travel blog is mainly maid up by pictures taken by her and 
her partner during the trip. Most of the photos are uncommented and shows the 
ocean and beach scenery. The photo of the flag ceremony on Yinyu Island is one 
of the few photos that are commented in some length. The photo shows some of 
the participants grouped together in front of a Chinese flag flying in the wind from 
a tall flagpole. The tourists are smiling towards the camera and are waving small 
Chinese flags. The travel company had provided the participants with flags to 
wave and to pose in front of the camera with. The woman writes about her 
experience that  
Yinyu Island left the most beautiful impression, there were a few families of fisherfolk on 
the island […] After we disembarked on the island we raised the flag […] When the flag 
was being raised I felt very excited. We chanted slogans like ‘I love the Motherland, I love 
Xisha’. After that we sang the national anthem. The organisers had arranged for some of 
the kids in the tour to raise the flag, which was very meaningful for them. (Xisha youji, 
2014) 
The woman tells us that here experience on the Yinyu Island was “the most 
beautiful” and that she felt “very excited” as the Chinese flag was raised. Through 
her account of the cruise, we can see how important rituals and ceremonies still 
are for legitimating power. 
Both Lane (1984) and Yurchak (2006) shows how Socialist ritual was crucial 
for legitimating the Soviet regime during its later decades. Lane points out that 
rituals and ceremonies where used to create consensus and solidarity. The rituals 
represented the values of the current dominant ideology and they spoke to the 
emotions rather than the intellect of the participant. Effective rituals should also 
be conducted during “occasions of heightened significance” (Lane, 1984:208). 
The flag ceremony on Yinyu Island is conducted at such an occasion. But it is an 
occasion that is of heightened significance for the participating individual and not 
for the nation as a whole. It is not like other flag ceremonies that are conducted 
during national holidays which has a collective meaning. But the private nature of 
the ceremony does not make it less meaningful. Going to the Paracel Islands is an 
exclusive experience, making it an important moment for the individual. Partaking 
in patriotic rituals during such an occasion boosts the significance of the ritual. It 
is an interesting picture of the individualisation and commercialisation of mass 
dictatorship; seemingly fitting well into the late-modern/post-industrialisation 
narrative of the 21st century.   
But even more meaningful than the temporal aspect of the ritual is in this case 
its spatial element. The rituals on Yinyu Island are taking place on a location of 
“heightened significance”. The place of rituals is very important for its emotional 
appeal (Lane, 1984:213). In the case of the Paracel Islands, because of the specific 
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position it holds in Chinese foreign policy, it is a powerful symbol of how China 
no longer will allow itself to be bullied by other states. All parties seem to be 
aware of the symbolisms that the Paracel Islands entail. By partaking in a ritual 
such as this, the participant confers legitimacy to the ruling party. And by sharing 
these experiences, ones hopes of going, or publicly stating ones opinion on the 
sovereignty issue online, the action creates legitimating force even outside the 
relation between participant and ruler. To show support in this way legitimites the 
relationship externally. By not being a strictly personal experience it gain 
legitimating function.  
A visit to the few local fisher families is also on the program. From a 
legitimation point of view it seems to be an important part of the expedition. This 
is a way of acknowledging that there are Chinese nationals inhabiting the islands 
and thus justifying the claim to the area. Their presence lends justificatory power 
to the Chinese claim. By making a visit to these fishers the participants can see for 
themselves that there is Chinese presence on the islands. By retelling this through 
blogs and other media, the notion that the islands are inherently Chinese is 
amplified.  
The participants are also swearing an oath during the “patriotic activities” on 
the island. According to Beetham’s understanding of legitimacy, oath swearing is 
one of the ways through which legitimacy is conferred to a ruler. Such an action is 
important in two ways for the contribution it does to legitimacy. Swearing oaths to 
a superior part in a power relation has “subjective binding force for those who 
have taken part in them, regardless of the motives for which they have done so” 
(Beetham, 1991:18). Even if an oath has been sworn out of self-interest, a 
normative commitment is introduced to the relationship. Secondly, swearing an 
oath, as in the case of the tourist cruise, is form of public expression of 
acknowledgement on the part of the subordinate of the position of the superior. It 
functions as a confirmation of the legitimacy of the power relation that is made in 
public (Beetham, 1991:18;91-92). In this case the ceremony has a wider audience 
than the participants through both the travel agency’s webpage and the blogs and 
photos that circulate online.    
But can consumption really be seen as a form of legitimation? It is not an 
action that traditionally has been understood as political. Nor Beetham or other 
legitimacy theoreticians are discussing consumption. However, a trip to the 
Paracel Islands is loaded with political meanings. The islands are part of an 
international dispute between sovereign states; a dispute that causes tensions that 
can have effects for the stability and security of the region according to analysts 
and scholars (see contributing authors in Kivimäki). The islands are also 
symbolically important in the military history of China who can boast few other 
military successes against other states, than the confrontation with the South 
Vietnamese navy outside Paracel Islands. The fact that the movie South China Sea 
Turmoil and its main theme is still occurring in today’s cultural sphere hints in 
that direction. Pictures from the movie are being spread online when Paracel 
Islands is discussed (Jimi Xiaoxian, 2014).  
By buying an expensive cruise to an island group in the South China Sea that 
plays a leading role in the foreign policy of the Chinese government is to justify 
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that political agenda. Through everyday tourism one has the opportunity to 
legitimate the politics of the government. An opportunity that many is ready to 
grasp despite the high price. But it should also be acknowledged that Paracel 
Islands boasts intriguing opportunities for diving and seeing beautiful coral reefs. 
A fact that of course contributes to making it an attractive tourist destination. 
Because of its position in foreign policy and its position in nationalist discourse, 
the trips to the Paracel Islands works as a powerful kind of political consumerism 
that legitimates the foreign policy of the government and the government in itself. 
The tourism can be analysed through Beetham’s third level of legitimacy: 
demonstrable expression of consent on behalf of the ruled. And it is especially 
interesting seen through a mix of the policy implementing role of the people under 
mass mobilisation mode of legitimacy and political consumerism. By partaking in 
a cruise and being a part of the economic activities surrounding the islands one is 
also making the claim stronger for China. The more de facto control China can 
boast, economically and militarily, makes it gradually harder for the opposing 
parties in the conflict, and the international community, to act against China’s 
claim. The costs for solving the dispute against the favour of China seems to be 
increasing the more China invests in the little archipelago. The stronger the de 
facto control that China has in the South China Sea, the de jure aspect of the issue 
will be less and less significant in the outcome or settling of the dispute. Tourism 
to the islands can thus take a not insignificant part in the dispute. Tourism also 
helps bringing the Paracel Islands closer to the Chinese people’s consciousness, 
making them aware of its existence and significance.   
The tourism to the Paracel Islands tap into the wider nationalist discourse in 
China that is partly fed by the government. Nationalist and patriotic values are 
used to legitimate government foreign policy. This discourse is then a facilitator 
for legitimating actions. It opens up certain spaces for popular legitimating 
activities, giving political agency to the subjects. But in this case, only for those 
who can afford it.  
5.2 Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute 
Not all uninhabited islands of territorial dispute are as paradisiacal as the Paracels. 
That is certainly true for Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a group of mostly barren rocks 
in the East China Sea. But that does not diminish the fervour that some activists 
engage in the conflict.  
The uninhabited islands called Diaoyu in Chinese and Senkaku in Japanese are 
the focal point of a controversial territorial dispute between People’s Republic of 
China, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Japan. The Japanese government has 
exercised power over the islands since 1890, except during the period after 
Japan’s defeat in World War II, when the islands were under US control for a 
time. Mostly the islands has been uninhabited but fish processing has been 
conducted there and fishers from Taiwan and Japan has landed on the islands and 
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shared the resources of its surrounding waters up until the sixties (Kawashima, 
2013). 
In 2010 there also had been an incident regarding the sovereignty of 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands when a Chinese trawler that were fishing close to the 
islands were confronted by Japanese coastguards and its crew arrested. The 
Chinese government issued a number of protests and demanded an apology 
(Hagström, 2012). The question of the territorial status of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands has been an infected issue for some time and its political significance has 
increased in China with rising nationalist sentiment. 
During August 2012 a crew of activists left Hong Kong in a fishing boat with 
the aim of landing on one of the islands and enforce China’s territorial claim. 
They managed to get ashore and put a Chinese flag on the island. The leader of 
the activists, Yeung Hong told the press that he cried of joy and pride after they 
had successfully raised the flag on the island (Li & Li, 2012). 
Despite the occasional sharpened tone in the diplomatic exchange between the 
countries when incidents as those mentioned above, the diplomatic relations 
between China and Japan had been stabilising since 1972. During September 2012 
the 40th anniversary of this normalisation was to be celebrated. But the Japanese 
government’s purchase of the islands from a private person that year angered the 
Chinese leadership and led to the cancellation of the celebration. Beijing said that 
it was a “gross violation of China’s sovereignty over its own territory” and that 
they “would not yield an inch” and take “necessary measures to protect its 
territorial sovereignty”, while also sending two military vessels to the vicinity of 
the islands (Przystup, 2013:110).  
Only the day after this official outburst, protests started outside the Japanese 
embassy in Beijing and soon spread to other cities where Japanese cars, stores and 
restaurants were vandalised. The protesters urged a hard line towards Japan and a 
boycott against Japanese goods (2013:111). 
5.2.1 Boycott 
Reilly argues that the 2012 protests and activism was more individualised than 
earlier anti-Japanese protests (Reilly, 2014:213). Academics urged the public to 
use the market as a tool for their political goal. According to Reilly, the boycotts 
“represents a potent extension of the public’s role in Chinese foreign policy”. He 
suggests that the Chinese public and the government formed a coordinated 
relationship to pressure Japan economically. While ordinary citizens engaged in 
the boycott and discussed it vividly online, the government encouraged the 
boycotts and also took some economic measures that targeted Japan (Ibid). As a 
result Japanese car sales in China plummeted and overall import from Japan to 
China dropped with 14 percent (Przystup, 2013:112). 
The 2012 boycotts shows how important political consumerism is for 
legitimating a cause even in an autocracy as China. To partake in an action such 
as a boycott can be seen as a form of demonstrable expression of consent; 
Beetham’s third level of legitimacy. It is a type of action that lends political 
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agency to the individual. Is in Western democracies, political consumerism seem s 
to be a form of political participation that is gaining in significance. It also seems 
like consumerism is being acknowledged as more significant. 
When the anti-Japanese riots turned a bit too unruly, with great material 
destruction as result, the Chinese government turned the public’s anger into the 
boycott by condemning violence and promote an economic boycott (Reilly, 
2014:211). People then consented to this turn into non-violent protest by airing 
support for it online and discussing how it best should be conducted for greatest 
effect (2014:212-4). By consenting and then acting accordingly people effectively 
legitimated the official policy, and in extension the government. In this way, the 
government’s non-violent policy still was legitimated, and their actions could be 
seen as more effective than the smashing of Japanese shops. 
The anti-Japanese boycott clearly points out the relational aspect of legitimacy 
between ruler and ruled. It is an interplay between initiatives and responses not 
only top-down but also from the bottom-up. The value system that justifies the 
power relation, in this case nationalism, is mobilising people around the cause. By 
participating in the boycott they are granted political agency. Political agency that 
is given trough consumerism also translates into actions of “expression of 
consent”. In the mobilisation mode of legitimacy, the role of the broad masses in 
implementing policy is vital. Even though the Mao-era and its huge mass 
movements seem long gone, this mode of mobilisation for legitimacy is not yet 
outdated in China. A boycott that engages many parts of society can pose as a 
typical image for how mass movements have travelled into the age of 
consumerism and “post-modernity”.   
5.2.2 Sovereignty souvenirs 
But the activism surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is not only focused on 
not buying stuff. Recently, a small industry of products focused on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands conflict has emerged.  
The 17th December the first “Defend Diaoyu Island Store” in the city of 
Baoding, Hebei province opened its doors. The Chairman James Soong of 
Taiwan’s First People’s Party, a pro-mainland political party, gifted the store with 
a calligraphy scroll with the store’s name. The owner, Mr. Chen, explains that all 
merchandise is connected to the protection of Diaoyu islands and he sells foods, 
drinks and books like Protect Diaoyu Islands and The Diaoyu Islands has always 
belonged to China, but also other kinds of souvenirs. Mr. Chen explains “that he 
opened his shop to carry on the goals of patriotism and protection of Diaoyu 
Islands, in order to pass on the feeling of patriotism and to strengthen the unity of 
the people. At the same time, the solemn statement of the store is to use the profits 
for Diaoyu-propaganda and other types of charity that benefits the society”.  (Li, 
2014).  
The pictures featured in the article on Chen’s store shows t-shirts with slogans 
printed on their chests in red. One reads “we are angry! Japan must apologise”. 
The Chinese flag that activists brought to one of the islands 2012 is on display in 
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the shop. You can also by cups with a picture of the largest island printed on the 
side with an immensely oversized Chinese flag montaged on the highest point of 
the island. A sign next to the cups reads “Stern statement! The Diaoyu Islands are 
China’s inherent territory!” in Chinese and in English it reads “Diaoyu Islands 
BELONG to China! They are NOT called Senkaku Islands!” (Ibid). 
Some people who wants to show their support for China’s claim over 
Diaoyu/Senkaku takes a more savoury approach. A “Defend Diaoyu Islands”-
themed restaurant in Beijing gained media attention when they were forced by the 
landlord to take down their big sign because the landlord were nervous that it 
might be too provoking. The owner dresses in camouflage clothes and the bar is 
resembling the pride of the People’s Liberation Army Navy: the aircraft carrier 
Liaoning. Among the dishes served are “Diaoyu Islands Grenades” which is deep 
fried banana, and sweet potato “Diaoyu Islands Rockets”. The walls of the 
restaurant is hanged with Chinese flags, patriotic posters, slogans and replicas of 
machineguns. The owner, Mr Lu, says that “we welcome everyone, including 
Japanese, we are just pledging our standpoint that Diaoyu Islands are Chinese and 
expressing our patriotic sentiments.” Mr Lu’s wife Zhang, clad in navy uniform, 
says that “Diaoyu Islands are Chinese. This sentence has been imprinted on our 
brains since we were small. So for me and other Chinese and Beijingers this is a 
very important matter.” Mr Lu comments the fact that he had to take down the 
sign with “But it was not like we had a sign that said ‘no Japanese or dogs 
allowed’ like other restaurants have had” (Diaoyudao malatang, 2015). The 
owner’s remark about the anti-Japanese sign is probably alluding to the restaurant 
that had a sign that said “This shop does not receive the Japanese, the Philippines, 
the Vietnamese and dog[s]” and provoked both anger and amusement from 
targeted groups (Racist Beijing restaurant, 2013). 
Not all Chinese can board a ship and set out to resist the Japanese occupation 
of the Diaoy/Senkaku islands one site. But through buying a t-shirt with a political 
message on, or eating “Diaoyu Islands Grenades” it is a way to participate. 
Consumerism flavoured with nationalism entrenches the nationalist discourse 
around these islands. While the tourism to Paracel Islands can have more direct 
consequences for international politics, the merchandise and food that surrounds 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku conflict is more of a symbolic nature. But the symbolic 
consumerism still is conveying legitimacy to the government’s policy. However, 
this kind of political consumerism must be deemed to be of the weaker kind. Even 
though the shop owner of the “Defend Diaoyu”-store claims he is going to donate 
money to the cause it can probably not be as effective as a full-blown boycott. The 
interesting thing about this kind of consumption is that it can foster collective 
political identities (Willis 2012:166). To consume according a political narrative 
creates a political identity and gives the feeling of political agency. By taking 
presence in the public sphere, this issue is something that people can relate to 
politically. By buying products that is associated with the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue 
one affiliates with the cause. It conveys legitimacy to the ruling party since it 
publicly validates and governor’s policy and at the same time it acknowledges the 
relationship between rulers and governed. Like the boycott, it is an image of 
where political agency is situated in today’s China.  
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6 Conclusion 
What is the role of the citizens or subjects for the legitimacy of a power structure? 
How can this role be understood and researched in an authoritarian society? In 
this thesis I have argued that popular legitimation is vital for the overall 
legitimacy of state power. Legitimacy is more than just the actions of 
governments, their performance and propaganda. For a regime to appear 
legitimate it needs to be legitimated by its people in publicly demonstrable ways. 
In liberal democracies the citizens can legitimate their government by casting 
their votes in open and free elections. That cannot be done in an authoritarian 
society. But non-democratic societies cannot last without legitimacy and therefor 
they cannot be without popular legitimation.  
The question posed initially in this thesis was: How is the political power 
structure legitimated in China? During the Cultural Revolution during the end of 
the Mao-era, legitimacy was secured by orchestrating huge mass rallies where the 
masses were received and they could salute the Chairman. But people also 
spontaneously organised other ways of publicly expressing legitimation and 
created new media to facilitate the information flow to help the grassroots’ 
activism. Advanced rituals emerged as ways of showing ones loyalty towards 
Mao.  
Today, those kinds of mass rallies and curious practises like “Mao Zedong-
Thought quotation gymnastics”, are stuff for historians, and Mao-cult objects and 
replicas are sold to tourists at flea markets. If mass rallies no longer pose an 
option, how is power in post-Mao China legitimated? I have argued that since 
market economy has been introduced, political consumerism has opened a new 
space for political agency. The theoretical contribution this thesis aims to make to 
the concept of legitimacy is to connect it with political consumerism. I have 
argued that political consumerism has become a complement to other legitimating 
practises. For legitimation, political consumerism works in two ways. By buying a 
product that is connected to a political narrative, like the territorial disputes, one is 
conveying legitimacy to that cause by publicly showing support. The effect is 
stronger in the case of Xisha-tourism than Diaoyu/Senkaku-merchandise because 
by partaking in strengthening China’s foothold on the islands helps the 
government’s foreign policy goals. The same is the case with a boycott. Political 
agency is given to the consumer, and in the case of anti-Japanese boycott the 
government encouraged the citizen’s methods; forming a relationship that 
legitimates in both ways.  
Can we use consumer data in assessing the legitimacy of regimes? A more 
systematic investigation of for example user generated internet content concerning 
consumerism, such as microblogs, could provide interesting insights in the 
perceived legitimacy of China.  
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But is mass mobilisation mode of legitimacy totally obsolete in present day 
China? Pak (2011) has argued that voluntarism has become more and more 
important for governing in China. In a legitimacy perspective, the huge voluntary 
efforts in the Sichuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai Expo 
hints to that mass mobilisation is not totally outdated as a way of legitimation. A 
systematic investigation into these kinds of efforts could show how the Chinese 
regime still needs to be legitimated by the broad masses.  
When investigating legitimacy, both theoretically and empirically, it is 
important not to only focus on the power holders in a society. An inquiry into 
legitimacy also must account for the people. A theory for legitimacy that is 
sensitive to the shifting forms and norms of political participation, in democracies 
and autocracies alike, must also take political consumerism into account.   
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